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The Emergence of Explicit
Knowledge in a Serial Reaction Time
Task: The Role of Experienced
Fluency and Strength of
Representation
Sarah Esser * and Hilde Haider
General Psychology 1, Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
The Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT) is an important paradigm to study the properties
of unconscious learning processes. One specifically interesting and still controversially
discussed topic are the conditions under which unconsciously acquired knowledge
becomes conscious knowledge. The different assumptions about the underlying
mechanisms can contrastively be separated into two accounts: single system views in
which the strengthening of associative weights throughout training gradually turns implicit
knowledge into explicit knowledge, and dual system views in which implicit knowledge
itself does not become conscious. Rather, it requires a second process which detects
changes in performance and is able to acquire conscious knowledge. In a series of three
experiments, we manipulated the arrangement of sequential and deviant trials. In an
SRTT training, participants either received mini-blocks of sequential trials followed by
mini-blocks of deviant trials (22 trials each) or they received sequential and deviant trials
mixed randomly. Importantly the number of correct and deviant transitions was the same
for both conditions. Experiment 1 showed that both conditions acquired a comparable
amount of implicit knowledge, expressed in different test tasks. Experiment 2 further
demonstrated that both conditions differed in their subjectively experienced fluency of the
task, with more fluency experienced when trained with mini-blocks. Lastly, Experiment 3
revealed that the participants trained with longer mini-blocks of sequential and deviant
material developed more explicit knowledge. Results are discussed regarding their
compatibility with different assumptions about the emergence of explicit knowledge in an
implicit learning situation, especially with respect to the role of metacognitive judgements
and more specifically the Unexpected-Event Hypothesis.
Keywords: implicit learning, conscious awareness, fluency, associative strength, serial reaction time task,
unexpected events
Esser and Haider The Emergence of Explicit Sequence-Knowledge
INTRODUCTION
Implicit learning refers to our ability to adapt to more or
less complex statistical structures in the environment without
possessing conscious access to the content of the acquired
knowledge, often even lacking any conscious knowledge that
something has been learned at all. An accessible example is the
knowledge about grammatical rules which develops early and
is hard to verbalize even for adults (Reber, 1989; Dienes et al.,
1991). But implicit learning processes are also important for
sequences of movements (e.g., typing on a keyboard; Nissen and
Bullemer, 1987; Willingham, 1998) or stimuli (e.g., visual, spatial,
or auditive; Haider et al., 2012; Ling et al., 2016), as well as for
social interactions (Heerey and Velani, 2010; Norman and Price,
2012).
There are two very prominent paradigms for studying
these so-called implicit learning processes: One is the Artificial
Grammar Learning Task (AGLT; Reber, 1989) and the other one
is the Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT; Nissen and Bullemer,
1987). In an AGL task participants are confronted with letter
strings that are constructed from artificial probabilistic grammar
rules. In a following test task participants are usually asked
to classify test strings as following or not following this rule.
In a SRTT participants react to a series of different target
stimuli by choosing a corresponding response. Unbeknownst
to the participant the stimuli and/or the responses follow a
certain probabilistic or deterministic sequence. Test tasks can,
mostly depending on the definition of consciousness, range from
recognition (Shanks and Johnstone, 1999), over free generation
(Wilkinson and Shanks, 2004), process dissociation (Jacoby,
1991; Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2001), and subjective
measures (Persaud et al., 2007; Haider et al., 2011) to verbal
report (Eriksen, 1960; Rünger and Frensch, 2010). In both
paradigms, the SRTT and the AGLT, participants are usually
unaware of the fact that their task followed a certain rule or
sequence, while their performance shows that, in fact, they have
acquired some knowledge about these [see e.g., Rünger and
Frensch, 2010, for a discussion about the adequacy of the different
measures for (un-)conscious knowledge].
In implicit learning research, a lot of effort is dedicated to the
question about the complexity, the flexibility and the structure
of the knowledge we extract from predictable structures (see e.g.,
Abrahamse et al., 2010, for an overview). Here, our goal is to focus
not on implicit learning processes per se, but on the question:
Why and how do some participants acquire conscious knowledge
about the unconsciously learned sequences? The paradigms used
in implicit learning research can constitute very useful tools for
addressing exactly this important topic.
One undoubtedly important aspect that divides unconscious
from conscious information processing is signal strength
(Kanwisher, 2001; Cleeremans and Jiménez, 2002). While
research on subliminal priming mostly leads to the conclusion
that perception seems to be unconscious when the signal strength
is very weak, there is more disagreement about whether having
a high signal strength is a sufficient condition for a bottom-up
signal to become conscious (Dehaene et al., 2006). Depending
strongly on the definition of consciousness and a potential
division between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block,
2005; Kouider et al., 2010; Cohen and Dennett, 2011), some claim
that strong activity in specialized local circuits (e.g., in extrastriate
areas; Lamme, 2003, 2010; Zeki, 2003; Block, 2007) is sufficient
and, thereby, allowing different, gradual qualities of conscious
perception (Overgaard et al., 2006; Nieuwenhuis and de Kleijn,
2011;Windey et al., 2014). Other researchers assume that a global,
cortical “ignition,” involving parieto-frontal networks which
allow for a top-down amplification (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001; Dehaene et al., 2003; Lau and Passingham, 2006; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011), is correlated with conscious information
processing. In this latter class of theories, consciousness is usually
seen as an all-or-none matter (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Kouider et al., 2010). While opinions still strongly differ about
the definition of conscious processing, there is more agreement
that global processing is associated with reportability and highly
flexible, strategic usage of the respective knowledge (Block, 2005;
Lamme, 2010; Cohen andDennett, 2011).Whenwe further speak
of conscious or explicit knowledge in this article, we refer to this
highly flexible, reportable form of knowledge.
The debate about the role of bottom-up signal strength and
additional higher-order top-down processes is also reflected in
the proposed mechanisms for the transformation from implicit
to explicit knowledge which shall further be the subject of this
paper. While there certainly are more diverging theories than
can be discussed here in detail, most of them can roughly be
differentiated by the role of the strength of associative weights
of the implicitly learned structure. Some theories, implying a
quantitative, gradual difference, assume that representational
strength and stability is the deciding factor for separating
unconscious from conscious processing. By contrast, others
assume qualitative differences where additional, higher order
processes are necessary to transfer unconscious into conscious
knowledge.
The former of these accounts is the more parsimonious one.
No qualitative separation between conscious and unconscious
representation is assumed, but rather a gradual transition.
These theories do not need any additional, hierarchically
higher, mechanisms that transform unconscious into conscious
representations. Therefore, these models are often referred to
as single-system views. One and the same learning, respectively
memory system can explain fast reaction times or simple
discriminative decisions when its associations are relatively weak
and, as these grow stronger throughout training, can account for
verbally accessible and highly flexible knowledge (Cleeremans
and Jiménez, 2002; Perruchet and Vinter, 2002; Shanks and
Perruchet, 2002; Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2003).
In contrast to these theories, there are so-called multiple-
system views which assume a qualitative distinction between
unconscious and conscious representations. According to these
accounts, representational strength is not enough to explain
the differences between both forms of knowledge. Instead,
consciousness is defined by a distinct form of information
processing. Therefore, it either has to be explained how
unconscious information is granted access to this particular form
of processing, potentially involving top-down amplification and
global processing (Keele et al., 2003), or how an independent
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learning system builds explicit knowledge on its own (Reber,
1989; Willingham, 1998; Sun et al., 2001; Frensch et al., 2003;
Haider and Frensch, 2005; Scott and Dienes, 2010).
There are hierarchical models that build a bridge between
stricter single-system and multiple-systems views. An interesting
account that fits into this position comes from Cleeremans et al.
(Cleeremans, 2011; Timmermans et al., 2012). Similar to single-
system views, they regard the gradually developing strength,
stability, and distinctiveness of representations as necessary
conditions for gradually developing explicit knowledge.
Nevertheless, they also include Higher-Order Thought (HOT)
Theories of consciousness (Rosenthal, 1997; Lau, 2008) into their
theory. HOT Theories assume that consciousness develops if
a hierarchically built system is able to represent that it knows
or does not know something (metacognition). In Cleeremans
(2011) theory, a simple feed-forward backpropagation network
develops first-order knowledge about any sequential structure
which enables predictive behavior. A similarly built, hierarchical
higher network simultaneously learns about the states of the
first-order system when this has made a correct or an incorrect
prediction and thereby develops second-order knowledge
about the first-order system possessing or not possessing
knowledge in a given situation. The assumption that the higher
order mechanism operates in the same way as the first order
mechanism makes this model a hybrid between single- and
multiple-system views. While multiple hierarchical layers of
learning are required for consciousness to develop, the same
strengthening mechanism is assumed for the generation of
implicit and explicit knowledge. Consciousness about the
implicitly learned sequence is still a gradual state, changing with
every trial from not-knowing to knowing whether something is
known, depending on the strength of the associative weights in
the higher-order network.
Metacognition also plays an important role in other multiple-
system views about the transition from implicit to explicit
knowledge. In theUnexpected Event Hypothesis (UEH), implicitly
learned contents are assumed to be encapsulated in local
modules. They can neither become conscious themselves just by
increasing strength throughout the learning process, nor does
the explicit learning process have direct access to the implicit
information. Instead, an indirect link is assumed, by which
explicit knowledge can develop when implicit learning leads
to observable, consciously perceivable, unexpected changes in a
person’s behavior (Frensch et al., 2003; Haider and Frensch, 2005,
2009; Rünger and Frensch, 2008). For example, having learned a
motor sequence implicitly in an SRT taskmight lead to premature
responses before the next target stimulus appears (Haider and
Frensch, 2009). This in turn might surprise the participant,
who might then start an attributive search process about the
reason for their ability to respond prematurely which often leads
to the detection of the underlying sequence. Still, as long as
there are other more obvious options the unexpected change
in behavior might be attributed to, search processes might be
terminated and no explicit knowledgemight develop (Haider and
Frensch, 2005). Importantly, while the implicit learning process
is assumed to develop knowledge by a rather slow strengthening
of associative weights (Cleeremans and Dienes, 2008), the
explicit learning mechanism does not operate in the same
way. Instead of accumulating strength via feedback about the
correctness of predictions, explicit attributional search processes
result in sudden insights following the unexpected occurrence
of predictive behavior. In an SRT task these sudden insights are
characterized by an abrupt drop in the reaction times (Haider
and Rose, 2007; Haider et al., 2011) as well as an increased
coupling of gamma-band activity between the right prefrontal
and occipital regions (Rose et al., 2010; Wessel et al., 2012).
Hence, according to the UEH, consciousness about the sequence
is not seen as a gradual matter, relying on a slow strengthening
of associations on a trial-by trial basis, as proposed by single-
system views or Cleeremans’ hybrid model (Cleeremans, 2011).
Nevertheless, the UEH would not dispute the idea that there
are higher-order learning processes which develop knowledge
about first-order states and are relevant for assessing what the
system knows or does not know. These learning processes might
for example be important for the accuracy of judgements of
knowledge. Increasing accuracy of judgements of knowledge
might in turn serve as a consciously perceivable, unexpected
change in behavior, which again leads to conscious sequence
knowledge. In the UEH anymetacognitive judgement about one’s
own behavior (perceiving increased fluency, accuracy, speed etc.
or unexpected mismatches in these aspects when the sequential
structure is suddenly replaced with irregular trials) can serve as
an unexpected event, triggering attributive processes.
Scott and Dienes (2008, 2010) proposed a similar account with
implicit learning leading to explicit judgement knowledge (gradual
improvement of the accuracy of second-order judgements).
Experiencing this meta-knowledge about one’s own behavior
can trigger a second attributional process leading to explicit
structure knowledge (insight into the sequential rules). Within
the AGL paradigm, they have shown that participants first notice
an increasing correlation between their feeling of familiarity for
learned grammar strings and their ability to discriminate learned
from new grammar strings (explicit judgement knowledge).
Perceiving this surprising ability, a second explicit learning
process is triggered, leading to explicit structure knowledge of the
grammatical rules.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discriminate between
the finer differences of these proposals. Rather, the aim is to
offer some insights into the fundamental assumptions about the
role of the strengthening of associative weights for the transition
from implicit to explicit knowledge. So far, not many studies have
empirically explored whether the same associative strength can
result in different development of explicit sequence knowledge.
While single-system, respectively strengthening accounts would
not expect such a difference in explicit knowledge, multiple-
system accounts like the UEH would allow different extents
of explicit knowledge for the same associative strengths, as
long as the learning situations lead to different metacognitive
judgements of one’s own behavior.
Rationale of the Experiments
In order to test the role of the strengthening of associative
weights against the role of metacognitive knowledge, we aimed to
create a situation where the associative strength is kept constant
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between two conditions but the metacognitive judgements, or
more specifically here, the subjective feelings of fluency differ.We
assume that participants who have the opportunity to experience
unexpected differences in their feeling of fluency are likely to use
this feeling as a trigger for explicit search processes, ultimately
resulting in more explicit sequence knowledge.
For testing this, we used an SRTT with the important
modification of the arrangement of trials that follow the sequence
(regular trials) and those that violate the sequence (deviant trials).
More precisely, we aimed to keep the number of correct and
incorrect transitions throughout the experiments equal between
all conditions. However, in one condition the regular trials and
deviant trials were arranged in alternating mini-blocks, while
they were arranged randomly in the other condition. It is
assumed that, due to the equal number of correct and incorrect
transitions, all conditions should be able to develop the same
strength of associative weight and gain a comparable rate of
implicit knowledge (Experiment 1). Concurrently, the difference
in the arrangement of trials should lead to differences in the
experienced fluency of the task. Participants working with mini-
blocks of regular and random trials should tend to experience
fluency differences between regular and random material,
while participants with randomly arranged material should not
experience such differences (Experiment 2). Participants who
experience differences in the fluency of the task should have
a tendency to search for the reasons of these experienced
differences and hence show a greater likelihood to develop
explicit sequence knowledge (Experiment 3). All experiments
used the same method.
GENERAL METHOD
Stimulus and Apparatus
In our version of the SRTT (Haider et al., 2012), a squared target
stimulus appeared in the upper third of the screen. The target
stimulus had a size of about 3 × 3 cm on a 17-inch screen and
contained a picture of one of six different colored circles. In
the lower two thirds of the screen six squared response stimuli
were presented in a triangular space, with each stimulus having a
size of about 2.8 × 2.8 cm. On each trial, the response stimuli
displayed the six possible target stimuli. The arrangement of
the six possible target stimuli within the response squares was
changed from trial to trial (Figure 1A). The locations of the
response stimuli were spatially mapped to the Y, X, C, B, N, and
M keys of a German QWERTZ-keyboard. The participants were
instructed to let their index-, ring-, and middle-fingers rest on
the six keys for the entire experiment and to press the key that
spatially corresponded to the response stimulus which contained
the target stimulus.
In all three experiments, 50% of the locations of the correct
response stimulus followed a regular sequence, which resulted in
a motor sequence of key strokes for the participants. Described
as response positions 1–6, the resulting sequence was 1-6-4-2-
3-5. The colored target stimuli were presented randomly with
the constraints that all six possible targets had occurred before
being shown again and that no response stimulus position would
contain the same stimulus more than twice consecutively. In
the other 50% of the trials, both the colored target stimuli
and the response stimulus locations were presented randomly,
with the constraints that no position would contain the target
stimulus successively and that all six positions were to be
used equally often in each of the training blocks. The crucial
manipulation in all three experiments was the arrangement of
the regular and random trials. In the Blocked-Order Condition
(BO-Condition), 22 regular trials were always followed by 22
random trials in the first two experiments (Figure 1B). In
Experiment 3, the length of these mini-blocks was extended
to 88 trials (Figure 1C). In the Random-Order-Condition (RO-
Condition) random and sequential trials were mixed randomly
(Figure 1D). All participants received the same material, but the
starting point was assigned randomly for each participant.
There were very slight differences in the proportion of regular
and deviant trials in both conditions. While the BO-Condition
had 49% regular and 51% deviant trials, the RO-Condition
contained 53% regular and 47% deviant trials in all experiments.
If these small differences, against our intention and expectation,
made a relevant difference for the associative strengths, then the
RO-Condition would build stronger associations, which would
not be in favor of our hypotheses.
Procedure
Each experiment consisted of a training and a test phase. The
training started with the presentation of the instructions on the
computer screen. Participants were instructed to react as fast as
possible while also avoiding mistakes. They were informed that
they would first receive 20 practice trials to get a first impression
of the task. These practice trials consisted of randommaterial that
followed the same constraints as the random material described
above. Each trial of the task began with the presentation of the six
response stimuli. After 100ms the target stimulus appeared for
150ms. After the participant’s response the screen went black for
300ms before showing the next six response stimuli in a different
arrangement. The course of a trial was identical in the test phases.
After the respective test, participants were debriefed and received
their financial reward or their course credit.
EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to show that the extent of
implicit knowledge depends on the amount of regular transitions
presented during training, not on the respective arrangement of
regular and random trials. As it is conceivable that the different
arrangements of the training material cause participants to
behave differently in the training tasks, even though they possess
comparable amounts of knowledge, we assessed the extent of
acquired knowledge with two different test tasks after training.
Half of the participants were tested with a wagering task (Persaud
et al., 2007; Haider et al., 2011). The other half received additional
test blocks in which they were confronted with blocks of either
sequential or random trials only.With the use of two different test
tasks we aimed to assess different aspects of implicit learning. The
wagering task assesses implicit knowledge without resorting to
reaction times by asking participants to predict the next response.
By additionally asking participants to wager on the correctness
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Two trials in the SRTT training (simple colored Stimuli; Experiment 2). (B) Structure of one block of the BO-Condition in Experiments 1 and 2.
Twenty-two sequential trials (S) were followed by 22 random trials (R), resulting in 176 total trials per block. Experiment 1 consisted of seven blocks, Experiment 2 of
six blocks. (C) In the BO-Condition of Experiment 3, 88 sequential trials were followed by 88 random trials (or vice versa) in each block. It was balanced in all
experiments whether a block started with sequential or random material. (D) One block of the RO-Condition in all three experiments consisted of 88 random and 88
sequential trials mixed randomly.
of their guess, this test enables us to detect whether participants
possess explicit knowledge. The three additional test blocks in
the second test are especially important as they assess knowledge
in terms of the usual performance differences between random
and regular blocks. Thus, it should detect knowledge with the
same sensitivity as the training phase (Shanks and St. John,
1994). This would allow us to test whether any possible training
differences between the two conditions reflect different amounts
of knowledge or different expressions of a comparable extent
of learning. If it is only the amount of regular transitions that
influences learning, the two conditions should not differ in the
two tests. By contrast, if the arrangement of trials matters, then
the two conditions should differ in the two test tasks.
Method
Participants
One hundred-twenty students of the University of Cologne (81
women) participated either in fulfillment of course credit or in
return for payment, with 60 participants in the Blocked-Order
and 60 participants in the Random-Order Condition which they
were randomly assigned to. The mean age was 24.4 years (range:
18–47, SD= 5.28). All participants reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.
Procedure
The procedure of the SRTT training was as described in the
General Method Section. The training task consisted of seven
blocks with 176 trials (4 × 22 sequential trials alternating with
4× 22 random trials in the BO-Condition).
For 60 participants (30 in each condition) the training
ended after these seven training blocks and they received the
instructions for the following wagering task. The wagering task
had the same design as the training task with two important
exceptions. First, it only contained regular trials. Second, on
36 of the 176 trials, the target stimulus was replaced with a
question mark. Participants were instructed to respond with
the key they considered to be the most likely response after
the previous trial. The question mark remained on the screen
until the participant gave a response. Subsequently, they were
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asked to indicate how sure they were about the correctness
of their prediction by wagering either 1 or 50 Cent on their
response. They were informed that they would earn the amount
if their prediction was correct and to lose it if it was incorrect.
Following the logic of the zero-correlation criterion (Dienes and
Perner, 1999; Dienes, 2008), this task allows to assess whether
participants possess implicit or explicit knowledge about the
sequence. Participants with implicit knowledge give more correct
answers than to be expected by mere guessing, while showing no
correlation between the correctness of their response and their
confidence (the amount wagered). By contrast, participants with
explicit knowledge should demonstrate a high rate of correct
responses that is above chance-level and a strong correlation
between the correctness of their response and their confidence.
For 60 participants (30 in each condition) the seven training
blocks were followed, without any special notice or new
instruction, by three test blocks. Their only difference to the
training blocks was that the first and last test block contained
purely random trials, whereas the second block consisted of solely
regular trials.
Results
We had to exclude six participants due to a technical error with
one computer (four in the BO-Condition). For the remaining 114
participants we analyzed themean error-rate for each participant.
Participants were excluded if their error rate, averaged over
all seven blocks, exceeded 15%. This led to the exclusion of
four participants in the BO-Condition and six participants in
the RO-Condition. Also one person of the BO-Condition had
to be excluded, because they did not finish the test task. For
the remaining 51 participants in the BO-Condition and 52
participants in the RO-Condition, individual median reactions
times (median RTs) were computed for each block. We excluded
errors and post-error trials from this computation (10.027%).
We excluded post-error trials because of post-error slowing
(Ruitenberg et al., 2014) and because trials after an erroneous
response also are based on a wrong transition. Also RTs larger
than 3000 ms (0.346%) were excluded.
Training Phase
Tables 1A,B depict the mean percent error rates and the means
of the median RTs of the training. For both dependent variables,
we conducted a 2 (Condition)× 2 (Trial Type: regular vs. deviant
trial)× 7 (Block) mixed-design ANOVA.
For mean error rates, a 2 (Condition)× 2 (Trial Type: regular
vs. deviant trial) × 7 (Block) repeated measures ANOVA yielded
a main effect of Block [F(6, 606) = 23.77, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.190]
and of Trial Type [F(1, 101) = 76.18, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.430]. As
can be seen from Table 1A, error rates decreased over the course
of training and error rate was higher on deviant trials. There also
was a main effect of Condition [F(1, 101) = 5.57, p = 0.020, ηp
2
= 0.052], due to the RO-Condition making more errors (6.3%
for the RO-, 4.9% for the BO-Condition). The interaction did not
reach the level of significance.
For median RTs a 2 (Condition) × 7 (Block) × 2 (Trial Type:
regular/deviant) mixed-design ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of Block [F(6, 606) = 140.33, p < 0.0001, ηp
2
= 0.581]
and of Trial Type [F(1, 101) = 138.34, p < 0.0001, ηp
2
= 0.578].
Table 1B shows that participants in both conditions became
faster over the course of the training and responded faster to
regular than to random trials. There also was a significant Block
×Trial Type interaction [F(6, 606) = 4.34, p< 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.041],
indicating that the differences between regular and deviant trials
increased over the course of the training, representing a general
learning effect. Follow-up interaction contrasts (Block 1 vs. 7
× Trial Type) revealed that both conditions showed a sequence
learning effect [F(1, 101)= 5.41, p= 0.022, ηp
2
= 0.051 for the RO-
Condition and F(1, 101) = 9.60, p= 0.003, ηp
2
= 0.087 for the BO-
Condition]. No other interaction reached the level of significance.
There was a trend toward a significant Condition × Trial Type
interaction [F(1, 101) = 3.07, p = 0.083, ηp
2
= 0.030]. This trend
might be due to a somewhat larger overall difference between
regular and deviant trials in the BO-Condition than in the RO-
Condition. Further, post-hoc tests point to the circumstance that
the larger difference between regular and deviant trials within
the BO-Condition is only present in the last three [F(1, 101) =
8.49, p = 0.004, ηp
2
= 0.078] but not in the first three blocks
(F < 1). Taken together the trend toward a Condition × Trial
Type interaction might indicate that, against our assumptions,
there could be a difference in the extent of acquired knowledge
between the two conditions with the BO-Condition acquiring
more knowledge than the RO-Condition.
Test Phase: Wagering Task
We first tested whether the participants’ acquired sequence
knowledge is better than expected by chance. For this purpose,
we tested the proportion of correct predictions in each condition
against a chance level of 20% (which implies that participants
only know that the same button is never to be pressed
successively). In both conditions the proportion of correct
predictions was significantly higher than chance level [t(26) =
2.70, p = 0.006, one-tailed, for the RO-Condition; t(24) =
2.54, p = 0.009, one-tailed, for the BO-Condition; see Table 2].
This further confirms that both conditions acquired knowledge
about the sequence which has already been shown in the
reaction times of the training phase. Furthermore, the amount
of knowledge did not differ between conditions [t(50) = 0.70,
p= 0.487].
Since our aim of the experiment was to show that the RO-
and the BO-conditions did not differ with regard to the strength
of their representations of the regular sequence, our main focus
was on this Null-hypothesis testing. Therefore, we additionally
conducted a Bayes analysis. Following Dienes (2014) we specified
our roughly expected maximum effect-size if the hypothesis was
true that both conditions differ. Based on the data of Experiment
3 in this paper and data from previous studies (Haider et al., 2011,
2012, 2014) we estimated that the maximum expected difference
between the percent correct predictions in the BO- and the RO-
Condition can reach 30% [presented as BH (0.30%)]. With this
estimated effect size the Bayes factor was BH (0.30%) = 0.02.
According to the conventions of Jeffreys (1939), a B smaller than
1/3 can be taken as substantial evidence for the H0 (a B > 3 is
taken as substantial evidence for the H1). Taken together, these
results confirm that both conditions acquired knowledge about
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TABLE 1A | Percent error rates and their respective standard deviations (in brackets) by training block, condition, and trial type (regular vs. deviant) in
Experiment 1.
Training Block Random-order
condition
Random-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Regular trials Deviant trials Regular trials Deviant trials
Block 1 8.50 (4.32) 9.57 (5.89) 6.44 (5.55) 7.33 (4.12)
Block 2 6.62 (4.68) 8.21 (4.37) 4.40 (3.29) 6.07 (3.35)
Block 3 4.85 (3.41) 6.45 (5.04) 4.11 (3.21) 5.55 (3.64)
Block 4 4.47 (2.88) 5.93 (3.86) 3.94 (3.31) 4.84 (3.42)
Block 5 5.05 (4.03) 6.48 (4.40) 3.06 (2.05) 5.41 (3.50)
Block 6 4.98 (3.84) 5.55 (3.78) 3.07 (3.14) 5.75 (4.80)
Block 7 4.70 (5.50) 6.80 (4.86) 4.05 (3.02) 5.55 (4.10)
TABLE 1B | Means of the median RTs and their respective standard deviations (in brackets) by training block, condition, and trial type (regular vs. deviant)
in Experiment 1.
Training Block Random-order
condition
Random-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Regular trials Deviant trials Regular trials Deviant trials
Block 1 995.2 (199.8) 1002.0 (190.4) 991.4 (185.3) 998.4 (185.0)
Block 2 928.0 (150.3) 954.5 (156.4) 917.5 (126.2) 938.8 (115.7)
Block 3 982.3 (132.7) 907.7 (128.6) 887.9 (103.2) 891.9 (106.8)
Block 4 865.5 (121.2) 886.7 (121.8) 846.4 (96.3) 875.9 (101.8)
Block 5 848.2 (111.5) 864.9 (108.2) 815.0 (83.5) 857.9 (94.7)
Block 6 829.3 (110.8) 857.8 (118.9) 807.5 (88.5) 850.4 (85.6)
Block 7 805.2 (96.7) 834.0 (98.62) 786.9 (83.7) 830.2 (91.4)
TABLE 2 | Percent correct predictions, percent high wagers given when
the prediction was correct, percent high wagers given when the
prediction was false, and their respective standard deviations (in
brackets) by condition in Experiment 1.
Condition Percent
correct
predictions
Percent high wager|
correct prediction
Percent high wager|
false prediction
Random-order 25.65 (11.00) 55.72 (34.94) 58.84 (32.35)
Blocked-order 28.50 (16.43) 48.50 (28.16) 46.31 (30.56)
the sequence and that the amount of acquired knowledge did not
differ between both conditions.
Next, we investigated whether this knowledge was explicit. If
so, participants should be able to strategically use their knowledge
to maximize their gains. We compared the proportion of high
wagers when participants made correct predictions with the
proportion of high wagers when they made a false prediction
(see Table 2). A 2 (Condition) × 2 (Wager Type: high|false
vs. high|correct) mixed-design ANOVA yielded no significant
effect (all Fs < 1). Hence, it seems that both groups acquired a
comparable amount of merely implicit sequence knowledge.
To exclude that the participants acquired explicit knowledge
during the test task, we contrasted the difference between
high|correct and high|false wagers in the first 12 wager trials
with that of the last 12 wager trials for both conditions. No
Condition showed a significant increase in the difference between
high|correct and high|false wagers (both ts< 1).
Test Phase: Transfer Blocks
For the error rates, a 2 (Condition) × 2 (Test Block 8/10 vs.
9) mixed-design ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Block
[F(1, 49) = 18.93, p< 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.279] indicating less errors in
the regular than in the random blocks. Neither the main effect of
condition (F < 1) nor the Condition× Block interaction reached
the level of significance [F(1, 49) = 2.79, p= 0.101, ηp
2
= 0.054].
Figure 2 shows the mean median reaction times of both
conditions for the test phase. A 2 (Condition) × 2 (Block Type
8/10 vs. 9) mixed-design ANOVA only revealed a significant
main effect for Block [F(1, 49) = 17.84, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.267].
As can be seen from Figure 2, participants in both conditions
responded slower in the random blocks than in the sequential
block.
In order to test whether the data of the transfer test speak for
our null-hypothesis that both conditions do not differ in their
acquired knowledge we again used Bayes statistics. Therefore,
we needed to specify the maximum plausible effect for the
difference between regular and deviant transfer test blocks for
both conditions. If both conditions did differ in their acquired
knowledge, the BO-Condition should show a greater difference
than the RO-Condition. We set 50ms as the maximum plausible
difference between the difference of regular and deviant trials
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FIGURE 2 | Means of the median RTs and their respective standard errors by transfer block and condition in Experiment 1.
in the RO-, respectively, the BO-Condition. These 40 ms were
taken as an estimation because of (a) the data from the last
three training blocks of Experiment 3 and (b) the data of
two Experiments of Eberhardt et al. (manuscript submitted
for publication). The former was chosen because there we
predicted a difference in the amount acquired knowledge. In the
latter two, participants were also trained with material arranged
similar to our RO-Condition and later tested with a comparable
transfer test, with the difference that we predicted and found a
difference in the amount of acquired knowledge due to different
instructions. With this estimated effect size the Bayes factor was
B (0.40 ms) = 0.14. A B< 1/3 indicates that the data of the transfer
block are in favor of the null-hypothesis. Thus, both conditions
do not seem to differ in the amount of the participants’ acquired
knowledge.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 show that participants in both
conditions acquired sequence knowledge during training,
indicated by the decrease of RTs and the significant Block ×
Trial Type interaction. However, there was a statistical trend in
the Condition × Trial Type interaction with the BO-Condition
showing a somewhat larger difference between regular and
deviant trials than the RO-Condition, particularly in the last
three training blocks. At first glance, this might contradict our
hypothesis that the amount of correct and incorrect transitions
determines the extent of acquired sequence knowledge, not the
arrangement of these trials.
However, when, in the two test phases, participants in
both conditions were given the same chance to express their
knowledge the results cast a different impression on the data.
The wager task shows that both conditions acquired knowledge
about the sequential structure. More importantly, it also reveals
no difference in the amount of acquired knowledge between
the two conditions as they made a comparable amount of
correct predictions. The data of the transfer test also support
this finding. Both conditions show similar differences between
regular and deviant trials and neither the effect of Condition
nor the Condition × Block interaction was significant. This is
especially important as it might be argued that the wager task is
less sensitive and therefore not able to detect small differences
in participants’ knowledge (Shanks and St. John, 1994). The
transfer test gives the participant the possibility to express their
knowledge in the exact same way as they did in the training
phase. This further fortifies the impression that both conditions
acquired a comparable amount of knowledge.
Thus, it seems likely that the differences between conditions
found in the training task do not indicate a difference in the
amount of acquired knowledge, but rather in the way participants
expressed this knowledge in the training task. It is conceivable
that the participants in the BO-Condition might have noticed
the blocked structure of the training blocks and also might have
experienced a fluency difference between the random and the
regular mini-blocks. This might have helped them to adjust their
performance accordingly. When a participant experiences more
fluency on the regular trials and less on the deviant trials, they
might, for example, be able to focus more on speed on the regular
and on accuracy on the deviant trials.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that
the different arrangement of the trial types does not affect the
amount of implicitly acquired knowledge and therefore provides
a solid basis for further investigating whether both groups indeed
experience a difference in the subjective feeling of fluency.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 tested whether the different arrangement of trials
types in the BO- and the RO-conditions affect the experienced
subjective feelings of fluency. The findings of Experiment 1 build
an important precondition for testing this as they exclude the
possibility that a potential difference in experienced fluency can
simply be explained by a different amount of acquired knowledge
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in the two conditions. It is assumed that the blocked arrangement
of the trial types leads to perceivable differences in the fluency
of deviant and regular trials while the random arrangement
should make it unlikely to experience such differences. In order
to assess the subjective feeling of fluency, we used the same
training phase as in Experiment 1 but a different test phase.
Here, participants were asked to compare the subjective fluency
of short blocks of regular and deviant trials. If our hypothesis is
correct, participants in the BO-Condition should be sensitive to
the differences in the fluency of the regular and deviant test trials
whereas participants in the RO-Condition should not, or at least
to a lesser extent. Since it cannot be excluded that the participants
in the BO-Condition adapt to this blocked structure of the
test task rather quickly, we also included a control condition
in which participants were trained with only random material
(All-Random; AR-Condition).
Method
Participants
Sixty students of the University of Cologne (48 women)
participated either in fulfillment of course credit or in return for
payment, with 20 participants in each of the three conditions,
which they were randomly assigned to. The mean age was 23.65
years (range: 17–33; SD= 3.68). All participants reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure
The training task was designed as described in the General
Method Section. There were only two slight differences to
Experiment 1. One difference was the stimuli being used; instead
of the rather complex colored circles from Experiment 1, we now
used simpler colored squares (the colors were: green, pink, cyan,
yellow, blue, and red). The other difference was that the training
task only consisted of six blocks this time.
In the test task, all participants were asked to compare two
consecutive mini-blocks of 18 trials each and rate which of the
two blocks felt more fluent to them. One mini-block contained
the learned sequence and the other block consisted of random
trials only. In order to reach maximal similarity to the sequential
trials, the random trials now had the additional constraint that all
six positions had to be used, before they could be repeated and no
“runs” (e.g., position 1 to 2, 2 to 3, etc.) were allowed. The order
of the mini-blocks was random. The first of the mini-blocks was
always announced with the notion “1st half ” and the second with
“2nd half” appearing on the center of the screen. After having
responded to the twomini-blocks, participants were asked to rate
which of the two halves felt more fluent to them by pressing “1”
for the first and “2” for the second half. In total, there were five
pairs of such mini-blocks, so participants gave five comparative
fluency ratings. The first pair of mini-blocks did not contain
any regular trials. It only served to sensitize the participants for
experiencing different subjective feelings of fluency: The mini-
block that was designed to feel more fluent was structurally equal
to the training sequence (i.e., all six keys had to be used before a
repetition was allowed, the fingers that had to be used alternated
between the left and the right hand). Additionally, the response
stimulus containing the target color on trial t already appeared
on the correct location on trial t–1. The mini-block designed to
feel less fluent did not have any of these properties and the only
constraints were avoidance of repetitions and runs. The data of
this block were excluded from further analyses. Besides a general
explanation of the test task, participants were instructed to focus
on their subjective feeling of fluency and to try not to focus on the
factors in the background of the task that might have an influence
on this feeling.
If the hypothesis that the participants in the BO-Condition
experience differences in the fluency of regular and deviant trials
during training, while participants in the RO-Condition do not,
is correct, then participants in the BO-Condition should rate the
regular mini-blocks as feeling more fluent more often than the
RO- or AR-Condition.
Results
One participant in the AR-Condition had to be excluded because
they did not finish the test task. For the remaining 59 participants
we analyzed the individual mean error-rates. According to
our error criterion of Experiment 1, two participants in the
AR-Condition and one participant in the BO-Condition were
excluded. For the remaining 56 participants, individual median
RTs were computed for each block. Again, we excluded errors and
post-error trials (11.43%) as well as RTs> 3000 ms (0.07%) from
this computation.
Training Phase
Tables 3A,B show mean percent error rates and mean of
the median RTs for each condition and for each training
block. We conducted 2 (Condition) × 6 (Block) × (Sequence
Type: regular/deviant) mixed-design ANOVAs for each of the
dependent variables to compare the two experimental conditions.
In a second step, we then analyzed the difference between
these experimental conditions and the AR-Condition with a 3
(Condition)× 6 (Block) mixed-design ANOVA.
For the error rates the first ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of Block [F(5, 185) = 3.39, p = 0.006, ηp
2
= 0.084].
This effect could not be attributed to specific differences between
single blocks by post-hoc tests, though there seemed to be a
numerical trend for participants making slightly more errors in
the middle of the experiment (lowest mean error rate: Block 1 =
5.7%, highest mean error rate: Block 3 = 7.7%, Block 6 = 6.8%).
There also was a significant main effect of Sequence Type, with
more errors being made on deviant than on regular trials [F(1, 37)
= 26.37, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.416]. There were no significant
interactions.
The second ANOVA (with all three conditions included)
yielded a main effect of Block [F(5, 265) = 0.022, p= 0.090, ηp
2
=
0.035; all other Fs < 1]. Post-hoc tests suggest that all conditions
showed slightly more errors in the sixth than in the first block
[F(1, 53) = 3.52, p= 0.066, ηp
2
= 0.062]. There was no Condition
× Block Interaction (F < 1).
For the RT, the first ANOVA revealed significant main effects
of Block [F(5, 185) = 28.35, p > 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.434] and Trial
Type [F(1, 37) = 101.21, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.732]. In addition, the
Condition × Trial Type interaction [F(1, 37) = 14.19, p < 0.001,
ηp
2
= 0.277], and the three-way interaction [F(5, 412) = 2.58, p
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TABLE 3A | Percent error rates and their respective standard deviations (in brackets) by training block, condition, and trial type (regular vs. deviant) in the
training phase of Experiment 2.
Training Block Random-order
condition
Random-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
All-random
condition
Regular trials Deviant trials Regular trials Deviant trials Random trials
Block 1 5.20 (3.56) 5.93 (3.78) 4.20 (3.65) 6.50 (3.61) 4.86 (3.60)
Block 2 6.51 (4.07) 7.47 (2.76) 5.86 (2.81) 6.56 (4.40) 5.98 (4.61)
Block 3 6.67 (4.12) 8.30 (5.50) 4.80 (2.69) 7.84 (3.22) 5.11 (3.69)
Block 4 6.26 (4.02) 7.80 (4.60) 5.10 (2.24) 6.50 (3.59) 4.57 (3.41)
Block 5 6.10 (4.75) 7.82 (4.17) 5.08 (3.04) 6.84 (3.41) 5.18 (3.87)
Block 6 5.41 (2.80) 7.34 (4.60) 3.91 (2.58) 6.97 (3.92) 6.19 (4.13)
TABLE 3B | Means of the median RTs and their respective standard deviations (in brackets) by training block, condition, and trial type (regular vs. deviant)
in the training phase of Experiment 2.
Training block Random-order
condition
Random-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
All-random
condition
Regular trials Deviant trials Regular trials Deviant trials Random trials
Block 1 760.0 (121.8) 766.3 (131.6) 690.3 (63.8) 718.7 (73.9) 736.8 (118.4)
Block 2 766.9 (127.5) 775.5 (120.6) 711.4 (66.6) 732.9 (80.6) 741.6 (118.1)
Block 3 752.0 (119.2) 764.9 (118.2) 689.5 (62.5) 730.4 (67.0) 740.5 (109.3)
Block 4 727.9 (109.9) 740.1 (98.9) 678.1 (65.9) 719.4 (73.4) 718.9 (103.4)
Block 5 725.9 (125.4) 733.5 (114.7) 662.2 (63.1) 701.0 (60.4) 968.5 (73.9)
Block 6 700.7 (106.3) 731.7 (120.8) 657.9 (57.8) 681.7 (61.7) 701.2 (89.8)
= 0.028, ηp
2
= 0.065] were significant (all other effects Fs < 1.5,
p> 0.4).
Thus, the picture of the results is a bit more complex than it
was in Experiment 1. As can be seen fromTable 3B, themean RTs
in both conditions decreased due to practice and deviants led to
generally slower reaction times than regular trials. However, we
did not find a significant Block × Trial Type interaction (F < 1).
This might be partially due to the BO-Condition showing large
RT-differences between regular and deviant trials from Block 1
on [F(1, 37) = 17.68, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.323] whereas the RO-
Condition merely showed a trend of an increasing difference
between regular and deviant trials, when comparing Block 1 with
Block 6 [F(1, 37) = 3.24, p = 0.080, ηp
2
= 0.081]. In parts, these
differences between conditions already explain the significant
Condition× Trial Type and the Condition× Block× Trial Type
interactions. Post-hoc comparisons additionally showed that the
participants in the BO-Condition responded faster to regular
trials than participants in the RO condition [F(1, 37) = 3.73, p =
0.060, ηp
2
= 0.092], whereas the deviant trials showed no such
difference [F(1, 37) = 1.74, p= 0.190).
The second ANOVA only showed a main effect for Block
[F(5, 265) = 24.37, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.315], suggesting a general
practice effect for all conditions. No other effect was significant
(Fs< 1.50, ps> 0.3).
Test Phase: Reaction Times
As a manipulation check, we first computed a 3 (Condition)
× 4 (Block) × 2 (Mini-Block: regular/deviant) mixed-design
ANOVA with mean RTs in the test phase as dependent variable.
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Mini-Block,
with regular mini-blocks leading to shorter median RTs than
deviant mini-blocks [F(1, 53) = 4.12, p = 0.047, ηp
2
= 0.072].
This main effect was qualified by a significant Condition×Mini-
Block interaction [F(2, 53) = 8.85, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.250] and a
significant Condition× Block×Mini-Block interaction [F(6, 159)
= 2.46, p= 0.0264, ηp
2
= 0.085]. Additionally, the Block×Mini-
Block interaction was significant [F(3, 159) = 3.31, p = 0.022 ηp
2
= 0.059; all other Fs< 1].
As can be seen from Table 4, the first two interactions
were mainly due to different performance patterns in the AR-
vs. the BO- and the RO-Conditions. Participants in the AR-
Condition showed faster median RTs for the deviant mini-
blocks than for the regular mini-blocks [F(1, 53) = 4.81, p =
0.033, ηp
2
= 0.083]. By contrast, participants in the RO- and
the BO-Conditions showed the expected reversed pattern [faster
responses for regular than for random trials: F(1, 53) = 12.05,
p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.185, F(1, 53) = 6.22, p = 0.016, ηp
2
=
0.105 for the RO- and the BO-Condition, respectively]. They
did not differ significantly from each other (F < 1). This
resembles the results of the transfer test of Experiment 1 and
strengthens the assumption that both conditions developed at
least some sequence knowledge. In the RO-Condition, this
difference between mini-block type increased with practice
showing larger RT-differences in the last two blocks than in the
first two blocks [F(1, 53) = 10.05, p = 0.002, ηp
2
= 0.159]. This
was not true for the BO-Condition, which showed comparable
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TABLE 4 | Means of the median RTs and their respective standard
deviations (in brackets) by training block, condition, and trial type (regular
vs. deviant) in the test phase of Experiment 2.
Test mini-block Random-
order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
All-random
condition
Regular 1 708.4 (112.6) 634.0 (56.4) 684.3 (106.9)
Deviant 1 716.1 (139.9) 640.6 (72.6) 651.3 (73.2)
Regular 2 696.2 (131.2) 624.2 (56.0) 679.6 (107.6)
Deviant 2 701.8 (118.6) 655.9 (57.2) 657.3 (78.6)
Regular 3 671.0 (114.3) 648.9 (78.3) 663.8 (101.8)
Deviant 3 731.8 (117.3) 653.9 (75.2) 662.4 (101.8)
Regular 4 691.8 (122.6) 621.9 (69.0) 658.0 (108.7)
Deviant 4 716.9 (138.9) 651.9 (62.5) 656.5 (76.4)
differences between these blocks (F < 1). Hence, it could be
assumed that participants in the RO-Condition needed some
time to adapt their behavior to the new structure of the
material.
Because Experiment 2 has no test for the learning effects on
its own and mostly relies on the interpretation of Experiment
1, the non-significant difference between the RTs of the
BO- and the RO-Condition in this test phase is particularly
important. Therefore, we calculated a Bayes factor with the same
estimated maximum effect of the transfer test of Experiment
1 [BH(0.40 ms) = 0.30]. Though not specifically designed to test
the participants’ knowledge, the test phase of Experiment 2
can help to support the assumption that the BO- and the
RO-Condition do not substantially differ in their acquired
knowledge.
Test Phase: Preference Judgements
To test whether the arrangement of the trial types in the training
task influenced the perceived fluency of the task, we analyzed
how often the regular or the deviant mini-block was chosen as
feeling more fluent. A 2 (Fluency-Judgement: regular/deviant)×
3 (Condition) Chi-Square Test showed a significant difference
between the conditions [χ (2) = 7.46, p = 0.02, V = 0.09]. Most
important for our hypotheses, the RO- and the BO-Condition
differed significantly [χ (1) = 3.92, p = 0.04, ϕ = 0.16]. The BO-
Condition rated the regular sequence as feeling more fluent more
often (see Table 5). The RO- and AR-Condition did not differ in
their choices (p= 0.45).
In addition, we also tested the relation between preference
judgements and the mean RT-differences. If participants rely
their judgement about the feeling of fluency on RT-differences
between regular and the random mini-blocks (median RT
deviant mini-block—median RT regular mini-block), we should
find a positive correlation between preference judgements and
RT-differences. Indeed, this correlation was positive (r = 0.22,
p< 0.05).
Discussion
Overall, Experiment 2 confirmed our main hypothesis that
participants in the BO-condition developed a stronger sensitivity
TABLE 5 | Frequencies of sequential and random mini-blocks rated as
feeling more fluent in the test phase of Experiment 2.
Mini-block Random-
order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
All-random
condition
Sequential 39 49 29
Random 41 27 39
for the fluency differences between the random and the regular
material than the RO condition. However, the analysis of the
median RTs of the training phase showed some unexpected
patterns. Only the RO-Condition showed a trend toward a Block
× Trial Type interaction, while the BO-Condition showed a
significant difference between random and regular trials from
Block 1 on. We have no really convincing explanation for
this unexpected finding as we used, with the exception of the
presented stimuli and the somewhat shorter training phase,
exactly the same training phase as in Experiment 1. Since
participants’ knowledge was not assessed in Experiment 2, the
interpretation of the reaction time data is difficult. Even though
the reaction times in the RO- and BO-Conditions seem to
suggest that knowledge about the sequence has been acquired,
the data are not very clear cut and it cannot fully be excluded
that both conditions did learn the sequence to a different
extent. However, the results of Experiment 1 suggested that both
conditions did not differ in the extent of learning, but differed
in the expression of this learned knowledge during training.
Like already suggested by a statistical trend in Experiment 1,
there was a significant Condition × Trial Type interaction in
Experiment 2. Therefore, replicating this performance difference
between the BO- and the RO-Condition is an interesting finding.
These preliminary considerations seem to be supported by the
reaction times of the test task. Comparable to the transfer test in
Experiment 1, the RO- and the BO-Condition showed significant
and comparable differences between regular and deviant mini-
blocks as the material changed to a blocked arrangement for
all participants. Additionally, the RO-Condition showed larger
differences between regular and deviant trials in the last two
blocks of the test task, which could mean that this group needed
a few trials to adjust to the blocked arrangement until their
performance matched the performance of the BO-Condition.
The AR-Condition did not show any adjustment to the material
over the four test blocks.
Most important to our hypothesis, the BO-Condition did rate
the regular mini-blocks as feeling more fluent than the deviant
mini-blocks. This was not the case in the RO-Condition. It
seems that the training with the blocked material leads to the
development of a higher sensitivity toward the differences in the
experienced fluency of deviant and regular trials. Additionally, we
found a correlation between the reaction time differences and the
tendency to rate the regular mini-blocks as feeling more fluent.
This might be a hint that the RTs provide a basis for the feeling of
fluency, with faster RTs being experienced as being more fluent.
However, it is also possible that the feeling of fluency relies on
other cues like the feeling of a repeatingmovement. Alternatively,
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the feeling of fluency might also influence the reaction times as
suggested by the observed Condition× Trial Type interactions.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that the different
arrangements of the training material did not affect the
extent of acquired implicit learning, but it did affect the
sensitivity toward the differences in the experienced fluency
between regular and deviant trials. According to the UEH
these (consciously) perceivable differences in the fluency of
the task are a violation of the expectancies of a participant
who concurrently perceives no differences on the surface of
the task. This unexpected violation of expectancies triggers an
attributional process which in turn can lead to explicit knowledge
of the underlying sequence. Therefore, Experiment 3 is designed
to test whether the blocked arrangement of the different trial
types leads to more conscious knowledge than the random
arrangement. In Experiment 1, we already tested for explicit
knowledge using the Wager Task. This task did not reveal any
signs of explicit knowledge. We assume that the short intervals
(22 trials each) make it difficult for explicit search processes
to successfully result in finding the sequence as any traces of
emerging explicit knowledge are rejected quickly because of
the following deviant trials. Therefore, we decided to prolong
the intervals of regular and deviant trials in the BO-Condition
to make it easier for the participants to detect the underlying
sequence.
Method
Participants
Sixty-four students of the University of Cologne (39 women)
participated either in fulfillment of course credit or in return
for payment. Their mean age was 24.50 years (range: 18–44, SD
= 5.0). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Thirty-two participants were in the BO-Condition and 32
participants in the RO-Condition1.
Procedure
The training task in Experiment 3 was identical to the training
task of Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First, the mini-blocks
of regular and deviant trials now contained 88 instead of 22
trials each. Second, the training task lasted eight instead of seven
blocks. The stimuli again were the more complex stimuli of
Experiment 1. Again, all participants received the wager task of
Experiment 1 after training.
Results
Two participants in the RO-Condition had to be excluded, due to
technical problems with the computers.
For the remaining 62 participants we analyzed the individual
mean error-rates. Our criterion led to the exclusion of two
participants in the RO-Condition and one in the BO-Condition.
For the remaining participants individual median RTs were
computed for each block. We excluded errors, post-error trials
(12.30%) and RTs> 3,000 ms (0.33%) from this computation1.
Training Phase
Tables 6A,B present the mean percent error rates and the
means of the median RTs per condition, block, and trial type.
We conducted 2 (Condition) × 8 (Block) × (Sequence Type:
regular/deviant) mixed-design ANOVAs separately for the two
dependent variables.
For the error rates, the ANOVA yielded a significant main
effect of Block [F(7, 399) = 4.78, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.463], and
of Sequence Type [F(1, 57) = 42.31, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.415].
The effect of Block indicated that participants in both conditions
made fewer errors over the course of training. The main effect of
Sequence Type was caused by higher error rates for deviant than
for regular trials. No interaction reached the level of significance.
Concerning the median RTs the ANOVA revealed significant
main effects of Block [F(7, 399) = 74.64, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.557]
and of Trial Type [F(1, 57) = 21.50, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.274].
Participants responded faster over the course of the training and
were generally slower on deviant trials. In addition, the Block ×
Trial Type interaction [F(7, 399) = 2.42, p = 0.020, ηp
2
= 0.041]
was significant, showing that the difference between regular and
deviant trials increased over the course of training. Post-hoc
tests suggest that the Block × Trial Type interaction was mainly
caused by the BO-Condition showing a large difference between
the first and the last block [F(1, 57) = 5.60, p= 0.021, ηp
2
= 0.090],
whereas the RO-Condition surprisingly did not show such a
difference (F < 1). This, again could be due to the RO-Condition
either gaining no knowledge about the sequence or because the
arrangement of trial types made it difficult to express sequence
knowledge. No other interaction reached level of significance.
Test Phase: Wager Task
As in Experiment 1, we first tested if the participants in
the two conditions gave more correct predictions than was
expected by chance (20% correct predictions). This was especially
important as the participants in the RO-Condition did not
show a significant learning effect during the SRT training. Both
conditions showed significantly more correct predictions than
expected by guessing [t(27) = 1.74, p = 0.05, one-tailed, for the
RO-Condition; t(30) = 4.24, p < 0.001, one-tailed, for the BO-
Condition]. Thus, the wager task revealed that both conditions
acquired a significant amount of sequence knowledge. As in
Experiment 1, this finding suggest that the RO-Condition did
not express their acquired knowledge in the same way as the
BO-Condition did in the training task.
Different to Experiment 1 but in accordance with our
hypothesis, the BO-Condition gave significantly more correct
1We would like to mention that we initially only had 22 participants in each
condition and later added 10 more to each condition. The reason is that we failed
to find a significant learning effect in the wager task of the RO-Condition after
the first 22 participants. Because the learning effect under the RO-Condition was
present in Experiment 1 where we had more participants, and because a learning
effect was marginally present after the first twenty-two participants, we decided
to collect more data (for a debate about the pros and cons of this practice see:
Simmons et al., 2011; Murayama et al., 2014).
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TABLE 6A | Percent error rates and their respective standard deviations (in brackets) by training block, condition, and trial type (regular vs. deviant) in
Experiment 3.
Training block Random-order
condition
Random-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Regular trials Deviant trials Regular trials Deviant trials
Block 1 8.79 (4.46) 9.57 (5.97) 6.33 (4.29) 7.48 (4.82)
Block 2 6.56 (4.18) 7.80 (4.55) 5.77 (3.64) 6.49 (3.79)
Block 3 5.73 (3.81) 8.10 (4.00) 4.53 (3.79) 7.01 (4.62)
Block 4 6.03 (4.76) 7.75 (4.64) 5.07 (4.62) 6.09 (3.50)
Block 5 5.87 (3.86) 7.50 (5.71) 5.40 (3.72) 5.96 (3.81)
Block 6 5.20 (3.76) 6.27 (4.98) 5.15 (5.68) 6.56 (4.11)
Block 7 5.27 (4.46) 8.30 (6.49) 5.78 (4.50) 6.05 (3.98)
Block 8 6.75 (4.98) 7.74 (4.27) 5.63 (3.78) 7.18 (5.33)
TABLE 6B | Means of the median RTs and their respective standard deviations (in brackets) by training block, condition, and trial type (regular vs. deviant)
in Experiment 3.
Training block Random-order
condition
Random-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Blocked-order
condition
Regular trials Deviant trials Regular trials Deviant trials
Block 1 955.3 (166.1) 963.2 (155.0) 904.3 (151.4) 927.4 (164.2)
Block 2 893.4 (108.8) 911.7 (116.4) 859.1 (128.9) 879.0 (125.5)
Block 3 875.7 (104.3) 887.9 (100.2) 808.4 (127.6) 858.5 (107.2)
Block 4 835.7 (92.4) 868.1 (86.4) 786.0 (147.5) 836.0 (98.0)
Block 5 815.4 (80.7) 849.4 (76.8) 765.0 (157.6) 816.0 (96.2)
Block 6 822.2 (77.7) 840.9 (85.7) 731.1 (152.9) 802.2 (93.2)
Block 7 796.2 (80.8) 825.6 (97.6) 723.7 (179.6) 794.1 (76.9)
Block 8 790.9 (85.4) 812.5 (87.1) 711.9 (167.4) 792.2 (89.6)
predictions than the RO-Condition [RO-Condition: 23%, BO-
Condition: 42%; t(57) = 3.21, p < 0.001]. Albeit, both conditions
received the same amount of regular trials, the BO-Condition
acquired much more knowledge about the sequence than the
RO-Condition.
The second analysis aimed to test if this larger amount
of knowledge in the BO-Condition concerns only implicit or
also explicit knowledge (see Table 7). A 2 (Condition) × 2
(Wager Type: high|correct vs. high|false) mixed design ANOVA
yielded no significant main effect for Condition, implying that
no condition had a greater tendency to give high wagers (F
< 1). The main effect for Wager Type was significant and
showed that more high wagers were given when the prediction
was correct [F(1, 57) = 5.87, p = 0.019, ηp
2
= 0.093]. Most
importantly, there was a significant Condition × Wager Type
interaction [F(1, 57) = 4.61, p = 0.036, ηp
2
= 0.075], showing
that the participants in the BO-Condition were better able to
use their knowledge strategically. Post-hoc tests further showed
that only the participants in the BO-Condition put more
high wagers on correct than on false predictions [F(1, 75) =
11.01, p = 0.002, ηp
2
= 0.162, RO-Condition: (F < 1)]. This
implies that the participants in the BO-Condition possessed
more explicit knowledge than the participants in the RO-
Condition.
TABLE 7 | Percent correct predictions, percent high wagers given when
the prediction was correct, percent high wagers given when the
prediction was false, and their respective standard deviations (in
brackets) by condition in Experiment 3.
Condition Percent
correct
predictions
Percent high wager|
correct prediction
Percent high
wager| false
prediction
Random-order 23.02 (9.16) 59.75 (30.95) 58.70 (30.52)
Blocked-order 41.45 (29.07) 65.78 (30.06) 48.43 (36.00)
Like in Experiment 1, we wanted to exclude that the
participants acquired explicit knowledge during the test task.
Therefor we contrasted the difference between high|correct and
high|false wagers in the first 12 wager trials with that of the
last 12 wager trials for both conditions. No Condition showed
a significant increase in the difference between high|correct and
high|false wagers [RO-Condition: t(27) = 1.38, p = 0.178; BO-
Condition: t(30) = 1.12, p= 0.271].
Discussion
Experiment 3 provided one important result: Prolonging the
mini-blocks from 22 trials to 88 trials led to explicit knowledge
in the BO-Condition, even though the number of sequence
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trials was not increased. This finding comes along with one
weakness, however. The data of the training did not reveal any
sequence learning in the RO-Condition (even after increasing the
number of participants). Only the wagering task suggested that
participants in this condition did possess some implicit sequence
knowledge.
Analyzing the reaction times of the training task could only
confirm a learning effect for the BO-Condition while the RO-
Condition did not show any signs of sequence learning in their
median RTs. As argued before, this could either mean that the
RO-Condition did not acquire any knowledge of the training
sequence or that they controlled their behavior differently than
the participants in the BO-Condition. Because the participants
in the RO-Condition never experience longer episodes of regular
trials where they can express their knowledge fluently, they might
not show their knowledge in their overt behavior and act more
stimulus-dependent. This is also the only experiment in this
series that could not reveal any signs of a learning effect in the
reaction times of the RO-Condition, possibly hinting at a power
problem. Supportive for the assumption that the participants
in both conditions did acquire some sequence knowledge, the
wager task showed that both groups were able to make more
correct predictions than to be expected by mere guessing. This
is important for further testing our hypothesis that it is the
difference in the experienced fluency that leads to differences in
the generation of explicit knowledge rather than the difference
in the strength of associative weights acquired in the training
task. Still, as Experiment 3 was designed to show differences
in acquired explicit knowledge, we are not able to show that
the implicit knowledge base is comparable in both conditions
because if the BO-Condition indeed did acquire more explicit
knowledge, this will also lead to more correct predictions in
the wager task. This is essentially what we found, analyzing
the wager task. Not only did the BO-condition make far more
correct predictions about the next response, they also were able
to use this knowledge strategically. Giving more high wagers
when a prediction was correct while giving less high wagers
when a prediction was false indicates that the participants not
only developed first-order knowledge about the sequence but
also second-order knowledge of knowing if they knew or did
not know the correct prediction. Taken together, Experiment 3
showed that being trained with the blocked arrangement of the
trial types leads to more explicit knowledge than being trained
with the random arrangement of the trial types.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
It was the aim of this article to test two important theories on the
generation of explicit knowledge in an implicit learning situation
against each other. Single-system accounts on the one hand,
respectively strengthening views, assume a gradual difference
between unconscious, implicit and conscious, explicit knowledge
(Cleeremans, 2008, 2011; Timmermans et al., 2012). Multiple-
system theories on the other hand disagree with the idea that
representational strength is a sufficient factor to explain the
transition from implicit to explicit knowledge (Sun et al., 2001;
Frensch et al., 2003; Scott and Dienes, 2008). Here we focused
on one of these multiple-system theories, namely the Unexpected
Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., 2003; Haider and Frensch, 2005,
2009; Rünger and Frensch, 2008). The UEH assumes that implicit
learning leads to changes in behavior which can be consciously
perceived as unexpected changes. Once an unexpected change in
one’s own behavior is observed, attributional processes can lead to
the generation of explicit knowledge. Various unexpected events,
here the unexpected difference in the experienced subjective
fluency, can serve as a trigger to start these attributional
search processes. The UEH views consciousness as an absolute,
dichotomous state, resulting from sudden insight rather than a
gradual developing state.
To test the UEH against strengthening accounts, we aimed
to create an experimental situation in which two groups should
not differ in their acquired associative strength because they
experienced the same amount of correct and incorrect sequence
transitions during a training task. The only difference between
the two groups was supposed to be in their opportunities to
experience differences in their feelings of fluency due to the
different arrangement of the regular and deviant trials. If a
simple strengthening account was correct, both groups should
show a comparable amount of explicit knowledge. If instead the
assumption that it needs an unexpected event to develop explicit
knowledge was correct, the group that experiences differences in
their feelings of fluency should develop more explicit knowledge.
In Experiment 1 we were able to show that the difference in
the arrangement of regular and deviant trials led to comparable
amounts of acquired knowledge, demonstrated both in a transfer
and in a wager task as well. This knowledge seemed to be mainly
implicit, as the wager task revealed that participants of both
conditions were unable to strategically use their knowledge. With
Experiment 2, we were further able to show that the differences in
the arrangement of the trial types led to the predicted differences
in the feeling of fluency between the groups. Together these
results provided the necessary preconditions for Experiment 3 in
which we aimed to show that these differences in the experienced
fluency eventually lead to differences in the resulting explicit
knowledge. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the participants in
the BO-Condition generated more explicit knowledge than the
participants in the RO-Condition.
Taken together, these results favor the UEH over a simpler
strengthening account. We assume that in our experiments it is
the difference of fluency between regular and deviant trials, which
can only be experienced in the BO-Condition that serves as an
unexpected event. Our results fit nicely with a recently published
study by Yordanova et al. (2015) who found that participants who
gain explicit knowledge show a greater variability in their RTs
which the authors interpret as an unexpected mismatch that may
serve as an oﬄine trigger for explicit learning processes.
Nevertheless, there are several critical empirical points in our
experiment that need further discussion and subsequent research.
First of all, we could not assume comparable performances in the
training as the reaction times differed between the BO- and the
RO-Condition. The interpretation of our data would be simpler
and more clear-cut if the reaction times of Experiments 1 and 2
could support the assumption that both conditions do not differ
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in their acquired knowledge. Instead, for all three experiments,
the RT-difference between regular and deviant trials was smaller
in the RO- than in the BO-Condition. In fact, Experiment 3 even
failed to show a significant Block × Trial Type contrast for the
RO-Condition. If these results are interpreted as showing that the
RO-Condition learned less about the sequence, the interpretation
of the remaining results would be ambiguous, favoring the more
parsimonious strengthening account.
However, due to the design of the training, the knowledge tests
in Experiment 1 and 3 seem to provide more reliable information
about the extent of sequence knowledge. Different studies have
shown that the performance in an SRTT can be an unreliable
measure of sequence knowledge, as it can, for example, vary
with different instructions for speed or accuracy (Hoyndorf and
Haider, 2009), with perceived conflict (Jiménez et al., 2009), or
task demands (Frensch et al., 1999). It seems plausible to assume
that the differences in experienced fluency are accompanied by
differences in performance during the training. It might be that
in the BO-Condition, the more fluent experience on regular trials
leads to a focus on speed while the less fluent deviant trials
favor a focus on accuracy. Complementary, in the RO-Condition
participants might show less decreased RTs on regular trials as
the discontinuous structure of the task leads to an extenuated
expression of the knowledge. The transfer test in Experiment 1
supports this argument as the BO- and the RO-Conditions show
the same performance once the structure of the task was identical
for both conditions.
Another aspect that has to be discussed is the representational
structure of the implicitly learned sequences. Because the BO-
and the RO-Conditions differ in the arrangement of the trial
types, it is possible that the representational structures differ
between the two groups. It is conceivable that the participants
in the BO-Condition learn something about the embedded,
predictable structure of the training task (Cleeremans and
McClelland, 1991; Pacton et al., 2015). Progressing in training,
they might learn that there is a deterministic structure embedded
after every 22 unpredictable trials and cognitively separate
regular and deviant chunks. From then on, the irregular trials
would no longer weaken the associative strength of the sequential
weights, leading to a stronger sequential representation in the
BO- then in the RO-Condition. While further experiments
should be conducted to exclude this explanation, we consider
it to be the less likely explanation. Research has shown that
embedded random sequences can have a weakening effect on the
associative weights before the system starts to learn that there
is a certain predictive structure in the task and adjusts to this
(Cleeremans, 1993). With six to eight blocks, our training task is
most likely too short to learn about this predictive structure. Also,
again, the data of our test tasks in Experiment 1 seem to speak
against the assumption that the participants in the BO- and the
RO-Condition have learned the sequence to a different extent.
A third objection might address the results of Experiment 3
which showed that there was more explicit knowledge when the
participants were trained with a blocked arrangement. It could
be argued that, due to the same strength of implicitly learned
sequence knowledge, both groups did try to find a sequence, but
only the BO-Condition could be successful in their search, while
the RO-Condition desisted from the idea of a possible underlying
sequence because the probabilistic structure made it too difficult
to find it. This assumption can be supported by the literature
comparing probabilistic and deterministic sequence learning.
Various authors have demonstrated that a probabilistic sequence
does interfere with the acquisition of explicit knowledge. When
participants are informed in advance of the training that there
is a certain structure or even what this structure is, they are
not able to profit from this information and usually show
no sign of explicit sequence knowledge (Schvaneveldt and
Gomez, 1998; Stefaniak et al., 2008). However, research on
probabilistic sequence learning uses this special kind of structure
for suppressing explicit learning without addressing the question
why it usually does not lead to explicit knowledge. It seems
to be the a priori assumption that additional explicit learning
processes cannot be successful under probabilistic conditions;
this could have been the case in our experiments as well.
Alternatively, it is possible that probabilistic learning conditions
lead to weaker representations because (a) regular trials are often
not equalized between deterministic and probabilistic conditions
and (b) even when they are, deterministic conditions lack the
weakening effect of additional deviant trials. Our BO-Condition,
especially in Experiment 3, might be seen as a deterministic
structure interrupted by blocks of deviant trials. Taken together
with Experiment 1, our results speak against the role of
representational strength for differences in the acquired explicit
knowledge between probabilistic and deterministic sequences.
This leaves two further explanations: First, as stated above,
participants do in fact acquire enough strength to develop explicit
knowledge but cannot further strengthen this knowledge because
the probabilistic structure is too difficult for an explicit learning
process. However, this option is not entirely compatible with a
simple strengthening account, as the explicit knowledge should
develop depending only on the strength of associations. An
additional explicit learning process would have to be assumed
that is triggered by representational strength but does not rely
on it itself. The second option, in line with our hypothesis, is that
the probabilistic structure hinders any metacognitive judgements
about one’s own behavior during the training task. Therefore,
there is no situation where a triggered explicit learning process
fails due to the complex structure of the task. A preliminary
argument for the second option would be the lack of explicit
knowledge at the end of the wager task. If participants had an
idea about an underlying sequence during training it seems most
likely that, as soon as the wager task starts, they remember their
initial assumption and start to search for the sequence again.
The data for the RO-Condition showed no signs of developing
explicit knowledge during the wager task. Additionally, it would
have to be explained why the participants in the RO-Condition
could not discriminate between the fluency of regular and deviant
mini-blocks in the test of Experiment 2, if both conditions did
not differ in their experienced fluency during training. Finally, it
has to be mentioned that we do not disagree with the idea that
even if we told the participants in the RO-Condition that there
was a sequential structure, they would not be able to find it. Our
main point is that any additional explicit learning process is not
triggered directly by associative strength and that, maybe even
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more importantly, associative strength of the transitions does not
govern explicit learning processes.
Also, the current experiments are not designed to test
the finer predictions of the UEH, like, for example, the
assumption that the explicit attributional processes have no
direct access to the implicitly learned knowledge. However,
while further experiments are certainly needed to precisely test
these assumptions, the current study provides another important
empirical piece in the puzzle of how explicit knowledge can
develop from implicit knowledge. The results so far are difficult
to reconcile with a simple explanation that relies on the
strengthening of associative weights and rather appear to be in
favor of the UEH. We also believe that the way we manipulated
the arrangement of regular and deviant trials with the intention
to keep the ratio of regular and deviant transitions balanced has
not been used in implicit learning research so far, but might
be an interesting methodological addition for studying present
controversies in this area of research.
Conclusion
(1) Experiment 1 demonstrated that our method of manipulating
the arrangement of regular and deviant trials does not lead
to a difference in the performance in either a transfer test
or a wager task. We interpret this as an indicator that the
different arrangements do not lead to a difference in the acquired
associative strength. (2) Experiment 2 further showed that
the participants in the BO-Condition seemed to experience a
difference in the fluency of random and regular trials, while the
participants in the RO-Condition experienced no such difference.
(3) When the intervals of regular and random trials were
prolonged in Experiment 3, the BO-Condition demonstrated
more explicit knowledge in a wager task. We interpret this
difference being caused by the difference in experienced fluency.
(4) Taken together, these results seem to be difficult to reconcile
with a simple strengthening account of the emergence of
explicit sequence knowledge. Rather, a metacognitive account
that pronounces the role of unexpected, observable changes in
one’s own behavior (i.e., experienced differences in fluency) seems
to be adequate for explaining the results.
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